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1. INTRODUCTION 
he labor market is one of the most important 
markets to be considered while studying 
economics. Labor force plays a significant 
role in the production process because its 
weaknesses and strengths have a great impact on 
the quality and quantity of products. Indeed, the 
performance of the labor market has a significant 
effect on the performance of the product market. 
Therefore, the study of the labor market is very 
important. 
Labor market, like any other market, has both 
supply and demand sides. The supply side of the 
labor market is the labor force. The labor force 
plays an important role in production and, given its 
role in production, expects to receive a share 
corresponding to its role. The demand side of the 
labor market is the firm (or the employer). A firm 
seeks to maximize its profits, and therefore expects 
the workforce to work hard to maximize its 
production and profit margins. 
One of the most important achievements of having 
an active labor force is the high profit level for the 
firm and also macro-economic growth and 
development. Creating motivation and welcoming 
individual creativity can help the labor force to be 
active. However, the labor force has expectations 
from the employer in order to work actively. 
T
A B S T R A C T 
In this paper, we analyze the interactions among workers, employers, and the government in the Iranian labor 
market using game theory. For this purpose, different games among the factors affecting the labor market are 
analyzed in both static and dynamic situations. In each case, intervention and non-intervention of the 
government are also examined. Thus, four different types of games are studied, including a static game 
between worker and employer, without government intervention; a static game among workers, employers, 
and the government; a dynamic game between worker and employer, without government intervention; and 
a dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government. In the first three games, Nash equilibrium 
implies low productivity of worker, low employer’s profits, and high unemployment rate in which players want 
to maintain the status quo. However, in the dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government, 
the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game can provide some conditions in which the labor market gets 
away from the low productivity situation 
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Certainly, having purchasing power, job security, 
and promotion of organizational status are among 
the most important factors that are at the top of the 
labor force’s expectations. Failure to adhere to the 
hierarchy and issues such as the lack of in-
organization decentralization are cases that kill the 
motive of the labor force. It should be noted that 
active labor will only arise if both sides of the labor 
market (i.e., the worker and the employer) interact 
in an accommodating manner. In addition, the lack 
of appropriate social coverage, including social 
security, is one of the main concerns of the labor 
force. However, these elements are considered as 
basic labor rights and there is no justification for the 
firm’s failure to provide them. 
In the labor market, interaction between worker and 
employer has been a major problem for a long time. 
The current labor market in most societies is the 
result of centuries of conflict and controversy 
between labor market factors. The main reason for 
this conflict is the distribution of profits between 
the employer and the worker. In fact, profits gained 
from selling of goods and services by a firm should 
be distributed among the factors of production. On 
the one hand, the employer, as the owner of the firm 
or pursuing the interests of the owner of the 
company, seeks to obtain the maximum share of the 
profits. On the other hand, the worker seeks to make 
his share of the profits to an acceptable level, and 
because the profit is a fixed amount, increasing 
one’s share will reduce another, which means there 
is a conflict between the interests of the worker and 
the employer. The question is, how do the worker 
and the employer determine their share of profits? 
The best approach for solving such issues is game 
theory. Game theory is based on a kind of mental 
argument derived from the combination of 
mathematics and logic. This theory monitors 
rational behavior in controversial situations in 
which participants engage in conflict. Game theory 
usually addresses the issues in which there are 
conflicting interests among participants. 
In addition to the worker and the employer, a third 
factor can also greatly affect the labor market 
interactions in Iran, and that is the government. The 
government, along with its very important role in 
the existence or absence of trade unions, plays a key 
role in the labor force’s life by using instruments 
like monetary and financial policies. The monetary 
and fiscal inconsistency of the government, which 
has been a major contributor to the spread of 
inflation in the community, has a direct and, of 
course, negative impact on the livelihoods of the 
workforce. Reducing purchasing power and 
individual welfare because of the growth of the 
price index along with issues such as the lack of 
productivity, lack of meritocracy, and sometimes 
lack of conscientiousness has a negative impact on 
the Iranian economy. However, the denial of trade 
unions, which is another factor that rises problems 
related to labor and government, should not be 
forgotten. In some cases, the government, because 
of the support of the worker, enforces the employer 
to increase the salary of the labor force, and because 
of the lack of labor organizations (which is the most 
important factor for protection of workers), 
employers fire some of the workers. These 
conditions signal the government’s adoption of a 
two-way policy that, on the one hand, can improve 
the conditions of business by placing the producer 
on a higher margin and, on the other hand, can 
improve the workforce in order to increase 
productivity. 
The purpose of this study is to provide a 
comprehensive perspective of the Iranian labor 
market and analyze the interaction between 
workers, employers, and the government in this 
market. Owing to many problems in the labor 
market and the unwillingness of the government to 
solve them, there are few studies in this regard in 
Iran; therefore, there is a deep gap in the literature 
on the Iranian labor market. A comprehensive 
analysis of the interactions of market participants 
can help to better understand it.  
In this paper, the interaction of labor market factors 
in Iran is discussed using game theory. In fact, the 
methodology used for analysis is game theory, 
which is one of the innovations of this research. 
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Static and dynamic analyses of interactions are 
additional innovations of the study. Government 
intervention in the labor market is also being 
considered, which is an innovation for the research. 
In the literature, in the theoretical discussion of the 
game between worker and employer, the 
government is not considered as a player; instead, it 
is presented as a judge that has little effect on the 
outcome of the game. In contrast, in this article, the 
government has come into play as a player, and 
some strategies have been defined for it. It is 
assumed that the government has the same effect as 
(or even more effect than) the other two players, 
because the current state of the Iranian economy is 
far from that of a developed economy or even a 
normal developing economy. In this regard, first, 
the static game is analyzed in the modes of 
government intervention and non-intervention, and 
then the dynamic game is examined in the two 
modes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Labor Market in Iran 
The labor market conditions in the Iranian economy 
are different from those of a free economy. In the 
Iranian labor market, there is a powerful factor 
influencing supply and demand, causing 
disequilibrium in the market. This factor that has an 
important role in determining the level of wages 
and employment is the government. The factors 
affecting the Iranian labor market are the (1) 
government, (2) employer, and (3) employee. 
By employing nearly 3.5 million people, the Iranian 
government is the largest employer in the country, 
reflecting the government’s unreliable role in the 
labor market. The intervention of the government in 
Iranian economy is weak and inefficient, causing 
the economy to be in an abnormal situation 
(Ghanbari and Sadeghi, 2007). 
The Iranian economy has been under pressure from 
sanctions and ineffective management in recent 
decades. It suffers from problems such as 
corruption, poor productivity in all sectors, lack of 
responsibility of the Executive and the Legislative, 
lack of transparency, laws and regulations, etc. 
Meanwhile, the government does not allow forming 
trade unions and, moreover, plays a very important 
role (using monetary and fiscal policies) in labor 
life. The monetary and fiscal discrepancies of the 
government, which have a major impact on 
inflation, have a direct and, of course, negative 
impact on the living conditions of workers. Decline 
in purchasing power and individual welfare as a 
result of inflation, along with issues such as lack of 
productivity, lack of meritocracy, dominance of 
relations rather than the rules, and sometimes lack 
of conscience, has negative effects not only on 
labor life but also on the economy. Every year, the 
government increases the wages in order to support 
the workforce, which, owing to the absence of labor 
unions (which is the most important factor in 
coordinating workers), results in employers firing 
some workers. 
Figure 1 shows the growth of real wages in the 
Iranian economy over the period 2005-2018. As can 
be seen, the growth of real wages has been negative 
for some years, indicating a decline in the 
purchasing power of the labor force and worsening 
their livelihoods. During the period 2013-2017, the 
government controlled the inflation and therefore 
increased the purchasing power of the labor force, 
but in 2018, with a significant rise in the inflation, 
growth in real wages declined again and the 
purchasing power of the labor force also declined.
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Figure 1. Growth in real minimum wages in Iran over the period of 2005-2018
Despite real wage declines in some years, the 
unemployment rate in Iran has always been more 
than 10%. Figure 2 illustrates the changes in the 
unemployment rate in the Iranian economy over the 
years 2005-2018.
 
Figure 2. Unemployment rate changes in the Iranian economy over the period 2005-2018
The existence of some structural problems, coupled 
with the intensification of international sanctions, 
has prevented the Iranian economy to move toward 
sustainable development. Therefore, even though 
the labor force is cheaper for firms, these firms have 
not been able to employ it, so the unemployment 
rate of the Iranian economy has always been high. 
The high unemployment rate and the large number 
of jobseekers have made the labor force want to 
work even at lower wages. Under such 
circumstances, the workforce is always threatened 
with layoffs and replacements. Thus, the workforce 
is likely to work below the minimum wage, and it 
would be natural for their productivity to be low. 
2.2 Study Background 
The labor force, as one of the main factors of 
production, has a growing role in sustainable 
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economic growth. In particular, in recent decades, 
development theories have shown the relative 
advantage of countries with regard to their human 
capital. 
The low profitability of economic firms in Iran is 
because of the low productivity of labor that is 
operating in these firms. The reason for the low 
level of productivity is the lack of motivation for 
work, the lack of concentration, and the lack of 
welfare, most of which are due to insufficient 
income. The wage of workers is not enough to 
cover all of their initial living expenses. This 
reduces the productivity of the labor force in the 
workplace (Sadeghi and Brumand, 2012). 
This study hypothesizes that if employers pay 
attention to this issue and increase the levels of 
laborers’ wages, the intellectual concerns regarding 
the labor force – the lack of concentration and 
mental relaxation – will reduce; as a result, 
productivity can be increased. Many factors can be 
effective at a low level of labor productivity (such 
as having advanced technology), but for 
simplification and according to the standards of 
economics, it is assumed that such factors are 
constant. It is also assumed that the level of wages 
is a standard criterion for the workforce’s utility, 
because with the increase in the wages of the 
workforce, their concerns about living expenses are 
reduced. In the next section, this subject is further 
elaborated. 
In Iranian economic literature, less attention has 
been paid to worker-employer relations, and 
research has focused on factors affecting labor 
productivity or the impact of productivity on 
economic growth. Among the articles emphasizing 
factors affecting labor productivity, we can refer to 
al-Badawi and Ali Janni’s research (2008). In their 
article, they have investigated the relationship 
between e-learning and employee productivity and 
have found a positive relationship between these 
two variables. Mahmoudzadeh and Asadi (2007) 
have focused on the impact of information and 
communication technology (ICT) on the growth of 
labor productivity in the Iranian economy. 
According to the research, total productivity and 
non-IT capital have the most impact on labor 
productivity in the Iranian economy. In addition, 
the effect of human capital and ICT capital on labor 
productivity has been positive and significant. The 
work of Mohammadi and Akbari Fard (2008) is 
notable among the studies being conducted on the 
relationship between productivity and growth. In 
their article, they discussed the impact of 
productivity shocks on Iran’s economic growth and 
concluded that supply shocks (productivity shocks) 
had a significant effect on economic growth. 
Komeijani and Memar Nejad (2004) examined the 
impact of human resource quality on economic 
growth and recognized the positive impact of labor 
on economic growth. Rabiee (2009) focused on the 
effects of innovation and human capital on 
economic growth and concluded that labor has a 
positive impact on increased production in the 
Iranian economy. 
Articles published abroad are more focused on the 
relations between the workers and the employer, 
and even the government, than internal articles. The 
following are some articles that discuss interactions 
between the worker and the employer through the 
game theory. Flesch et al. (2009) studied the so-
called production games and categorized their 
production games on the basis of the Markov 
transition structure. Mitrou and Karyda (2006) 
emphasized employability criteria, which includes 
the collection of accurate information about the 
worker; this information is essential for the 
employer. Jones and Simon (2005) determined the 
earnings of the workforce according to their skill 
and education. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
(2000) suggest two types of games in which two 
workers struggle for a job, and ultimately the 
employer employs the worker who has asked higher 
wages. All of these articles examine the game 
between the worker and the employer, each one in 
a way. In none of the above articles, the 
government has entered a game as a player, and if 
it has entered the discussion, it is more of an 
observer and has not had a significant impact on the 
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outcome. This is due to the fact that the economy 
studied by these scholars is free economics and has 
normal conditions that do not require government 
intervention. According to the authors’ 
information, there are few papers about government 
involvement in the game of worker and employer, 
one of which is by Wang (2008). In his article, 
Wang discussed the insurance of rural migrant 
workers working in urban institutions, in which the 
government forces the institutions to insure these 
workers and, in the event of refusing to insure them, 
impose heavy fines on institutions. In this case, 
because an abnormal economic situation occurs 
unlike the market mechanism (insecure workers), 
the government enters the game. 
Araujo and Souza (2010) have studied dynamics of 
the labor market in developing countries using 
game theory. They say a stylized fact of the labor 
market in developing countries is that it is highly 
segmented in informality. One of the main factors 
that induce workers and firms into informality is an 
excessive regulatory system that makes formal 
economy attractive. They analyze the dynamics of 
workers and firms’ entrance and withdrawal of the 
formal and informal economy, assessing the impact 
of taxes by using an evolutionary game theory 
approach in which economic agents decide for one 
these markets according to the expected payoff. 
Moreover, they have evaluated the optimal relation 
between regulatory and enforcement action by the 
government. 
Benjamin (2015) has studied a gift-exchange game, 
in which a profit-maximizing firm offers a wage to 
a fair-minded worker, who then chooses how much 
effort to exert. The worker judges a transaction 
fairer to the extent that his own gain is more nearly 
equal to the firm’s gain. The worker calculates both 
players’ gains relative to what they would have 
gained from the reference transaction, which is the 
transaction that the worker most recently personally 
experienced. His model explains several empirical 
regularities such as rent sharing, persistence of a 
worker’s entry wage at a firm, insensitivity of an 
incumbent worker’s wage to market conditions, and 
– if the worker is loss averse and the reference wage 
is nominal – downward nominal wage rigidity. The 
model also makes a number of novel predictions. 
Whether the equilibrium is efficient depends on 
which notion of efficiency is used in the presence 
of the worker’s fairness concern, and which is 
appropriate to use depends partly on whether loss 
aversion is treated as legitimate for normative 
purposes. 
Chen (2019) investigated how externalities from 
downstream competition shape sorting in upstream 
labor markets. He models this as a two-stage game: 
an initial stage of simultaneous one-to-one 
matching between firms and managers, and a 
second stage of Cournot competition among 
matched pairs. If a firm’s technology and human 
capital are strategic complements, it is rational for 
each firm-manager pair to expect that the remaining 
agents will form a positive assortative matching 
(PAM), and the PAM on the grand market is a 
stable matching under rational expectations. The 
PAM remains stable even when they are strategic 
substitutes, but the substitutive effect is moderate. 
However, if the substitutive effect is sufficiently 
strong, a negative assortative matching is stable. 
Chen also discussed social welfare induced by 
stable matchings. 
As noted earlier, the purpose of this study is to 
analyze the relationship between the worker, 
employer, and government using game theory. In 
other words, our goal is to find the equilibrium 
among these three players in the current situation in 
the Iranian economy. The game among these three 
factors has not been fully explored in Iran so far, in 
both static and dynamic games; what can be 
deduced from previous studies is that the current 
situation in the Iranian labor market is not favorable 
and the workers lack motivation, which leads to 
reduced labor productivity and employer profits. 
The model presented in the next section seeks to 
obtain labor market equilibrium using game theory 
and compare that with the current conditions.  
3. MODEL 
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This paper seeks to analyze the behavior of the 
factors of the Iranian labor market using game 
theory. In this regard, the static and dynamic 
analyses of the game are examined. It is assumed 
that the information is complete. 
Each player follows a series of short- and long-term 
benefits that are not necessarily opposite each other. 
Because of the lack of unemployment insurance, 
workers are extremely worried about losing their 
jobs, and as a result, maintaining jobs is important 
to them. Changing the current conditions will result 
in an increase of the unemployment rate in the short 
run, but if the employer is allowed to maximize 
profits, his profit will increase in the long run and 
he will therefore expand the organization and seek 
to hire more workers (including expelled workers) 
with higher wages. In other words, changing the 
current condition will be better for workers in the 
long run but will harm them in the short run. 
The long-term benefits of the firm, such as 
increasing production capacity and increasing 
profits, require the current situation to change, but 
changing the situation results in severe resistance 
from the workers and sometimes even the 
government, which may lead to the closure of the 
firm. Safeguarding from workers’ strikes is one of 
the most important and crucial options for the 
employer (even if its profit is low). Therefore, the 
short-term benefits of the employer require him to 
be satisfied with the status quo. 
Increasing the productivity and production is very 
beneficial for the government. Such a situation 
could, in case of occurrence, be a way to achieve 
the goals of long-term plans by the government. 
However, maintaining employment for the 
government is vital, and the government’s short-
term benefits are secured if the current situation of 
the market is sustained.  
With regard to the above issues, the long-term 
benefits of the three players are in contrast to their 
short-term interests. In the following discussion, we 
want to show that these three players prefer their 
short-term interests to their long-term benefits. 
This section has two sub-sections. In sub-section 
3.1, the static game with complete information is 
studied with both non-intervention and intervention 
of the government. In sub-section 3.2, the dynamic 
game with complete information is examined with 
both non-intervention and intervention of the 
government. 
3.1 Static Game 
A static game with complete information refers to a 
game in which players simultaneously make their 
own choices and the game payoffs are common 
knowledge for all players. The first step in studying 
static games with complete information is to 
understand how to represent a game. A game can 
usually be shown in two ways: normal form and 
extensive form presentations. Extensive form 
presentation is mainly used in dynamic games. 
Static games are usually displayed in normal form 
presentation. However, both types of games can be 
shown in both forms. 
We now examine the static game with complete 
information of the Iranian labor market with cases 
of intervention and non-intervention of 
government. 
3.1.1 Static game when the government does 
not intervene in the market  
The normal form representation of the static game 
between the worker and the employer can be 
expressed as follows. 
The set of players  
This game has two players, namely the employer 
(E) and the worker (W). 
(1) 𝑁 = {𝐸, 𝑊} 
The set of strategies  
To determine the strategies of each player, we must 
first determine what each player wants. 
Employer 
Employer seeks to maximize his profits and thus 
performs any action that leads to an increase in 
profits and avoids actions that reduce his profits. It 
is assumed that the firm is not satisfied with the 
current output, and the output produced by its labor 
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force does not have much benefit to the employer. 
Therefore, in order to increase profits, the employer 
must encourage his workforce to produce more. We 
assume that the way the employer chooses to 
encourage his/her workers is by increasing their 
wages. In such a situation, the costs of the employer 
will also increase. Indeed, although the employer 
expects that this strategy will increase only the 
workforce’s profits, the costs of the firm will 
increase too. Therefore, stimulating workers to 
work more by increasing their wages brings with it 
the risk of lowering profits compared with before. 
In other words, it is a risk for the employer to take 
such an action because workers may not increase 
their production by increasing wages. Therefore, 
the employer has two options: either he should be 
convinced by the current benefits and willing to 
maintain the status quo, or he should increase the 
wages of workers in the hope of increasing 
production and expect to escape from the existing 
situation and increase profits. Therefore, 
employer’s strategies can be written in the form of 
a change in the status quo (C) and maintaining the 
status quo (K). So, the set of employer strategies is 
as represented below: 
(2) 𝑆ா = {𝐶, 𝐾} 
Worker 
The worker seeks to maximize his utility. It is 
assumed that the utility of the worker increases 
when his wage increases permanently, because the 
increase in the wages of the worker means that he 
can afford more life expenses. It is also assumed 
that the wage level of the worker is low and does 
not allow him to cover all his living expenses, and 
that the worker is therefore not satisfied with the 
current level of his wages; hence, he tries to 
increase his productivity to increase the firm’s 
production in the hope that the employer will 
increase his wages in exchange for increased 
production. In such a situation, the worker 
gradually loses his physical ability, and his 
permanent salary may not increase. In other words, 
the employer may give him a temporary 
remuneration in order to increase labor productivity 
and may not increase his wages permanently. 
Therefore, an increase in the worker’s effort, which 
leads to an increase in the employer’s production, 
has the risk of not increasing the permanent wage 
for the worker. So, the worker has two options: 
either he should be satisfied with the current wage 
and continue to produce a low level of productivity 
and have a tendency to maintain the status quo, or 
he should increase his effort in the hope of 
increasing his permanent wage and try to be 
relieved of the status quo. Therefore, the worker 
strategies can be expressed in terms of changing the 
status quo (C) and maintaining the status quo (K). 
Therefore, the set of worker strategies is as given 
below: 
(3) 𝑆ௐ = {𝐶, 𝐾} 
 
Players’ payoffs 
In general, in a two-player game between the 
worker and the employer, there are four situations 
for player 𝑖: 
1. Player 𝑖  selects Strategy C, player 𝑗  chooses 
Strategy C. 
2. Player 𝑖  selects Strategy C, player 𝑗  chooses 
Strategy K. 
3. Player 𝑖  selects Strategy K, player 𝑗  chooses 
Strategy C. 
4. Player 𝑖  selects Strategy K, player 𝑗  chooses 
Strategy K. 
We can use the numbers 1 to 4 to rank the possible 
consequences for each player, so that the best 
situation is represented with the number 4 and the 
worst case is represented by the number 1. The goal 
of evaluating situations with numbers 1 to 4 is to 
give only one priority to each player, and these 
numbers can be any other number with the 
condition of observing the order. This preference is 
not too unfamiliar to players in the game theory. For 
example, there is such an argument in the prisoner’s 
dilemma. 
The worst case for each player is when he chooses 
strategy C and the other player chooses strategy K 
(situation 2). If this happens to the employer, its 
costs will increase (through wage increases) 
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without increasing its production and its profit will 
be less than before. If this happens to the worker, 
he will have to work more without raising his 
wages. This is the case for both players with the 
number 1. 
The best case for each player is when he chooses 
strategy K and the other player chooses strategy C 
(situation 3). In this case, the employer will 
generate more profits without increasing costs 
because the worker will increase his productivity. 
In this case, the employer’s profit is higher than in 
all other situations. If this happens to the worker, he 
will be able to earn more wages and achieve a 
higher level of welfare with the same effort. This 
situation is estimated for the worker and the 
employer with the number 4. 
If both players choose strategy C (situation 1), the 
employer achieves higher profits and the worker 
gets more wages, but because the choice of strategy 
by both players costs them, it is better than situation 
3. So, we rate this for both players with number 3. 
Nevertheless, situation 4, in which both players 
tend to maintain their position, will be ranked with 
number 2. 
In brief, we can write the normal form of a two-
player game between the worker and the employer 
as follows: 
1. The set of players  
 (4) 𝑁 = {𝐸, 𝑊} 
2. The set of strategies  
(5) 
𝑆ா = {𝐶, 𝐾} 
𝑆ௐ = {𝐶, 𝐾} 
𝑆 = 𝑆ா × 𝑆ௐ = {𝐶, 𝐾} × {𝐶, 𝐾}
= {(𝐶, 𝐶), (𝐶, 𝐾), (𝐾, 𝐶), (𝐾, 𝐾)} 
3. Players’ payoffs 
(6) 𝑢ா
(𝐾, 𝐾)
= 2 
𝑢ா(𝐾, 𝐶)
= 4 
𝑢ா(𝐶, 𝐾)
= 1 
𝑢ா(𝐶, 𝐶)
= 3 
 
𝑢ௐ(𝐾, 𝐾)
= 2 
𝑢ௐ(𝐾, 𝐶)
= 1 
𝑢ௐ(𝐶, 𝐾)
= 4 
𝑢ௐ(𝐶, 𝐶)
= 3 
The matrix form of this game is as follows:
 
The game is a prisoner’s dilemma, and the Nash 
equilibrium can be found through the best answer. 
To find the Nash equilibrium, we obtain the best 
responses of each player to the opponent’s 
strategies. 
The best responses of player E to each strategy 
selected by rival W are as represented below. 
(7) 𝐵ா(𝑠ௐ = 𝐶) = 𝐾 
𝐵ா(𝑠ௐ = 𝐾) = 𝐾 
Therefore, the best response of player E to any 
strategy selected by rival W is strategy K. That is, 
the employer will always have the tendency to 
maintain the status quo, regardless of whether the 
worker wishes to change or maintain the status quo. 
The strategy K for employer is actually a strictly 
dominant strategy. 
The best responses of player W to each opponent’s 
strategy are represented below. 
Table 1: Static game between worker and employer without government intervention 
Worker (W) 
 C K 
 
Employer (E) 
C 3,3 1, 4 
K 4, 1 2, 2 
Reference: Research calculations 
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(8) 𝐵ௐ(𝑠ா = 𝐶) = 𝐾 
𝐵ௐ(𝑠ா = 𝐾) = 𝐾 
So, like the employer, the dominant strategy of the 
worker is the tendency to maintain the status quo 
(i.e., K). The best response of each player is shown 
by a line drawn under the payoff of that player in 
Table 1. The strategy profile (𝐾, 𝐾 ) is the Nash 
equilibrium. But what is the reason for this 
equilibrium? Why is the worker and the employer 
happy with an equilibrium with lower productivity, 
when both can gain a better payoff by choosing 
strategy C simultaneously? The main reason is the 
lack of trust between the worker and the employer. 
In fact, neither party can trust its opponent and 
therefore chooses strategy C. 
The equilibrium outcome is not a Pareto’s optimal, 
and as noted, players can increase their payoffs 
through cooperation. If the game is repeated 
between the two players, both players should better 
coordinate their actions based on Pareto’s optimal 
outcome and get rid of the prisoner’s dilemma by 
choosing a cooperative strategy. If it is possible that 
the worker and the employer agree or trust each 
other, they will be better off than the Nash 
equilibrium. In fact, if both players can stay loyal to 
each other, they will achieve outcome (3,3) rather 
than outcome (2,2). 
3.1.2. Static game with government 
intervention 
Nash equilibrium of a static game between the 
worker and the employer is a low-level equilibrium 
in which both players tend to maintain the status 
quo. What will happen if the government also 
intervenes in the labor market and enters the game? 
Can the government direct the game from a low-
efficiency equilibrium to a high-efficiency 
equilibrium? 
The role of the government in the economy became 
more prominent after the Great Depression of 1929 
and Keynes’ views about the greater intervention of 
the government. In Iran, from the beginning of the 
development programs, the government has played 
a significant role in guiding economic activities and 
has always had a heavy shadow over the markets in 
the country’s economy. The labor market is also 
one of a variety of markets that have not been 
immune to the government’s intervention. 
Reducing unemployment and creating more 
occupation opportunities is one of the most 
important goals of various states in Iran during the 
past years. Reviewing the performance of the 
government in development programs shows that 
the government has not succeeded in achieving the 
goals of the programs. 
Here, the government is assumed to be playing as a 
player, and simultaneously, together with the 
worker and the employer, chooses a strategy. In 
order to define government strategies, we must first 
understand the goals of the government. The 
government must achieve the goals of development 
programs. It is assumed that the unemployment 
rates and per capita income are different from those 
defined in the development program. This 
difference means that the goals of the program are 
not fulfilled, which is not desirable for the 
government. Hence, the government is looking for 
a way to not only increase per capita income but 
also lower unemployment. The solution that the 
government finds for this is to set the minimum 
wage above the wages paid to the workers and force 
the employer to pay the wage. If this decision is 
made, the purchasing power of the workforce will 
increase, and the labor force can cover more costs 
of living. In this case, the workers’ mental concerns 
also decrease, and they can work with more 
concentration and more peace of mind, which may 
also lead to increased production and profitability 
of the firm. By increasing profits, the firm develops 
its business to make more profit; it invests more and 
recruits more. As the process continues, not only 
will the incomes of workers in the whole society, as 
well as per capita income, increase, but more 
employment will also be created, and 
unemployment will decrease. Thus, the government 
will be able to achieve its goal. 
On the contrary, it is likely that even with the 
increase in wages, the work force will not increase 
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its efforts and productivity, and only employer costs 
will increase owing to a rise in wages. In this case, 
the employer will be forced to expel a number of 
workers. With the dismissal of workers by 
enterprises, unemployment will increase, and the 
labor market will get worse, which is not politically 
acceptable for the government. 
However, the government’s decision to raise the 
minimum wage would be risky. Therefore, the 
government must accept the risk of social and 
political moves to change the current situation. 
Moreover, the government can tolerate the current 
situation and decide not to change production and 
per capita income. So, the government has two 
choices (or strategy): the decision to change the 
status quo (strategy C) or to be satisfied with the 
current situation (strategy K). 
The set of government (G) strategies is as follows: 
(9) 𝑆ீ = {𝐶, 𝐾} 
If any of the players wants to think and evaluate the 
game results, then they should consider the possible 
scenarios. From the perspective of each player, 
there are six situations, which are the following: 
1. Chooses strategy C and the other two players 
both choose C. 
2. Chooses strategy K and the other two players 
both choose C. 
3. Chooses strategy C and the other two players 
both choose K. 
4. Chooses strategy K and the other two players 
both choose K. 
5. Chooses strategy C and one of the players 
chooses C and the other chooses K. 
6. Chooses strategy K and one of the players 
chooses C and the other chooses K. 
We can use the numbers 1 to 6 to rank the possible 
results for each player, so that the best situation is 
represented by the number 6 and the worst case by 
the number 1. The worst case for each player is 
when he chooses strategy C and the two other 
players both choose strategy K (situation 3). If this 
happens to the employer, its costs will increase (by 
raising wages) without increasing its production, 
and earnings will be less than before. If this happens 
to the worker, he works more without a raise in his 
wages. If the government chooses strategy C, and 
the worker and the employer both choose strategy 
K, then the government adopts a policy that has no 
positive consequences, in which not only the 
program’s goals will not be realized, but the 
government will also incur the costs of adopting the 
policy. This situation is valued for every player by 
the number 1. 
The best situation for each player is when he 
chooses strategy K and the two other players both 
choose C (situation 2). In this case, the employer 
achieves higher profits without raising costs, as the 
worker increases his productivity, and the 
government also seeks to change the status quo and 
meet the goals of the development plans to help the 
firm increase its production. If this happens to the 
worker, he will be able to earn more wages and 
achieve a higher level of welfare with the same 
effort. If the government chooses strategy K, and 
the worker and the employer both choose C, the 
government can achieve the goals of the program 
without any risk. This is the case for all three 
players with number 6.  
If all three players choose strategy C (situation 1), 
the employer will profit more, the worker will pay 
more, and the program’s goals will be met, but 
because choosing this strategy is with risk, this 
situation will cost all three players. In addition, it is 
more expensive than situation 2. This situation is 
indicated by number 5. 
Of the remaining three modes, mode 6 is preferred 
for each player. Therefore, the result of this 
situation is indicated by number 4. Although it costs 
all three players, they prefer the fifth situation to the 
fourth. As a result, situations 4 and 5 are ranked 
with numbers 2 and 3, respectively. 
We can represent the strategic form of the game 
among the worker, employer, and government as 
follows: 
The set of players  
(10) 𝑁 = {𝐸, 𝑊, 𝐺} 
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2. The set of strategies  
(11) 
𝑆ா = {𝐶, 𝐾} 
𝑆ௐ = {𝐶, 𝐾} 
𝑆ீ = {𝐶, 𝐾} 
𝑆 = 𝑆ா × 𝑆ௐ × 𝑆ீ
= {𝐶, 𝐾} × {𝐶, 𝐾}
× {𝐶, 𝐾} 
𝑆
= {(𝐶, 𝐶, 𝐶), (𝐶, 𝐶, 𝐾), (𝐶, 𝐾, 𝐶), (𝐶, 𝐾, 𝐾), (𝐾, 𝐶, 𝐶
3. Players’ payoffs 
(12) 
𝑢ீ(𝐶, 𝐶, 𝐶)
= 5 
𝑢ௐ(𝐶, 𝐶, 𝐶)
= 5 
𝑢ா(𝐶, 𝐶, 𝐶)
= 5 
𝑢ீ(𝐶, 𝐶, 𝐾)
= 6 
𝑢ௐ(𝐶, 𝐶, 𝐾)
= 3 
𝑢ா(𝐶, 𝐶, 𝐾)
= 3 
𝑢ீ(𝐶, 𝐾, 𝐶)
= 3 
𝑢ௐ(𝐶, 𝐾, 𝐶)
= 6 
𝑢ா(𝐶, 𝐾, 𝐶)
= 3 
𝑢ீ(𝐶, 𝐾, 𝐾)
= 4 
𝑢ௐ(𝐶, 𝐾, 𝐾)
= 4 
𝑢ா(𝐶, 𝐾, 𝐾)
= 1 
𝑢ீ(𝐾, 𝐶, 𝐶)
= 3 
𝑢ௐ(𝐾, 𝐶, 𝐶)
= 3 
𝑢ா(𝐾, 𝐶, 𝐶)
= 6 
𝑢ீ(𝐾, 𝐶, 𝐾)
= 4 
𝑢ௐ(𝐾, 𝐶, 𝐾)
= 1 
𝑢ா(𝐾, 𝐶, 𝐾)
= 4 
𝑢ீ(𝐾, 𝐾, 𝐶)
= 1 
𝑢ௐ(𝐾, 𝐾, 𝐶)
= 4 
𝑢ா(𝐾, 𝐾, 𝐶)
= 4 
𝑢ீ(𝐾, 𝐾, 𝐾)
= 2 
𝑢ௐ(𝐾, 𝐾, 𝐾)
= 2 
𝑢ா(𝐾, 𝐾, 𝐾)
= 2 
The game can be written in the form of a matrix, in 
which the player G (government) is shown as a 
page, and each page corresponds to a player’s 
strategy. 
1. Player G chooses strategy C:
2. Player G chooses strategy K:
In Tables 2 and 3, the first number to the right is the 
payoff of player E (employer), the middle number 
is the payoff of player W (worker), and the number 
on the left side is the payoff of player G 
(government). 
The Nash equilibrium can be found through the best 
response. To do this, we obtain the best responses 
of each player to the opponent’s strategies. 
1. The best responses of player E: 
(13) 
𝐵ா൫𝑠ିா
= (𝐶, 𝐾)൯ = 𝐾 
𝐵ா൫𝑠ିா = (𝐶, 𝐶)൯
= 𝐾 
𝐵ா൫𝑠ିா
= (𝐾, 𝐾)൯ = 𝐾 
𝐵ா൫𝑠ିா = (𝐾, 𝐶)൯
= 𝐾 
2. The best responses of player W: 
Table 2:  Static game among players, if the government chooses strategy C 
Player (W) 
 C K 
 
Player (E) 
C 5,5,5 3, 6, 3 
K 6, 3,3 4, 4, 1 
Reference: Research calculations 
Table 3: Static game among players, if the government chooses strategy K 
Player (W) 
 C K 
 
Player (E) 
C 3,3, 6 1, 4, 4 
K 4, 1, 4 2, 2, 2 
Reference: Research calculations 
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(14) 
𝐵ௐ൫𝑠ିௐ
= (𝐶, 𝐾)൯ = 𝐾 
𝐵ௐ൫𝑠ିௐ = (𝐶, 𝐶)൯
= 𝐾 
𝐵ௐ൫𝑠ିௐ
= (𝐾, 𝐾)൯ = 𝐾 
𝐵ௐ൫𝑠ିௐ = (𝐾, 𝐶)൯
= 𝐾 
3. The best responses of player G: 
(15) 
𝐵ீ൫𝑠ିீ
= (𝐶, 𝐾)൯ = 𝐾 
𝐵ீ൫𝑠ିீ = (𝐶, 𝐶)൯
= 𝐾 
𝐵ீ൫𝑠ିீ
= (𝐾, 𝐾)൯ = 𝐾 
𝐵ீ൫𝑠ିீ = (𝐾, 𝐶)൯
= 𝐾 
The best response of each is indicated by a line 
under the payoff of that player in Tables 2 and 3. 
The strategy profile (K, K, K) is the Nash 
equilibrium of this game. 
The equilibrium outcome states that all three 
players tend to maintain the status quo, although 
this outcome does not have the most payoffs for 
them. This means they prefer their short-term 
interests to long-term interests. This equilibrium is 
the equilibrium in low productivity. An economy 
with low labor productivity can never achieve its 
development goals. Low productivity results in 
lower per capita income, followed by a decline in 
purchasing power and lower demand, resulting in a 
deep recession and a lack of sufficient investment 
and, consequently, a low level of productivity. In 
other words, the production process is caught in a 
vicious circle, which results in economic 
backwardness. 
3.2 Dynamic Game 
3.2.1 Dynamic game when the government does 
not intervene in the market  
In the static game, all players choose at the same 
time, whereas in the dynamic game, each player 
chooses his strategy after the other player’s move. 
In the dynamic game between the worker and the 
employer (without government intervention), it is 
assumed that the employer starts the game. He 
initially chooses one of the strategies of changing 
the status quo or keeping the status quo, and then 
the worker selects a strategy by observing the 
employer’s moves. 
From the perspective of each player, four situations 
can be considered: 
1. Player i chooses strategy K and player j chooses 
Strategy C. 
2. Player i chooses strategy C and player j chooses 
Strategy K. 
3. Both players choose strategy K. 
4. Both players choose strategy C. 
These situations are rated from 1 to 4, where 
number 1 shows the worst situation and number 4 
shows the best situation for each player. The best 
situation for each player occurs when he chooses 
the strategy of keeping the status quo (i.e., strategy 
K) and the opponent chooses the strategy of 
changing the status quo (i.e., strategy C). In this 
case, the player achieves his goal (increased profit 
or utility) without enduring any cost or risk. 
Therefore, situation 1 is evaluated for each player 
with number 4. The worst situation occurs when the 
player chooses strategy C and the opponent chooses 
strategy K, because in this case, not only does the 
player not aim at his goal but he also incurs risks 
and costs. So, we rate situation 2 with number 1. 
Given that both players tend to change the situation 
even in the face of risk, they prefer to change the 
existing situation with risk (if both players want to 
change) to maintain the status quo. So, situation 4 
is evaluated with number 3 and situation 3 with 
number 2. 
The extensive form of the dynamic game between 
the worker and the employer, assuming there is no 
government intervention in the labor market, is 
presented in Figure 3. In this figure, it is assumed 
that the employer starts the game. One must 
exercise care regarding how the situations for the 
players are rated; even if the worker starts game, the 
outcome of the game does not differ.
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Figure 3. Dynamic game between the worker and the employer, without government intervention 
In Figure 3, if the employer chooses strategy C, 
then the worker chooses strategy K because this 
strategy has a higher payoff than strategy C (4> 3). 
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of the left sub-
game is strategy K by the worker. The choice of this 
strategy will reduce the employer’s payoff to 1. On 
the contrary, if the employer chooses strategy K, 
then the worker, observing the employer’s move, 
chooses strategy K (with valuation 2) because it has 
a higher payoff than strategy C (with valuation 1). 
So, the Nash equilibrium of the right side of the 
game is also strategy K by the worker. In this case, 
the employer will gain a payoff of 2. By comparing 
this payoff with the payoff derived from the Nash 
equilibrium of the left sub-game (i.e., 1), the 
employer chooses a higher-valued strategy, that is, 
strategy K. As a result, the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium is as follows: 
“The employer chooses strategy K in the first stage, 
and then, in the second stage, the worker observing 
the employer’s move, will choose strategy K.” 
The equilibrium achieved in this dynamic game, 
like the static game, is low-level productivity 
equilibrium. 
3.2.2 Dynamic game assuming government 
intervention 
Consider the circumstances in which the 
government becomes a player in the game between 
the worker and the employer. In this case, can the 
government affect and improve the equilibrium of 
the game between the worker and the employer, 
which has a low level of productivity? To answer 
this question, the rules of the three-player game 
must be clearly defined and the various situations 
facing each player must first be assessed. 
For each player, four situations can be considered 
as follows: 
1) Player chooses strategy K and the two other 
players choose strategy C. 
2) Player chooses strategy C and one or both other 
players choose strategy C. 
3) Player chooses strategy K and one or both 
players choose strategy K. 
4) Player chooses strategy C and both of the other 
players choose strategy K. 
For each player, there are only 4 situations; 
therefore, the scenarios are rated from 1 to 4, where 
1 means the worst and 4 means the best situation for 
each player. The best situation for each player is 
situation 1 because the player achieves whatever he 
wants without taking risks and costs. This situation 
is then evaluated with number 4. The worst case is 
situation 4, in which the player takes the risky 
strategy and at the same time does not achieve his 
goal. Between situations 2 and 3, situation 2 is 
better than 3 because although the player chooses a 
risky strategy, he achieves what he wants. 
Therefore, this situation is rated with number 3. 
Situation 3 is therefore rated with number 2 and 
states that although the player has not reached his 
goal, there is no risk for him. 
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The extensive form of the worker-employer-
government dynamic game in the labor market is 
shown in Figure 4. As the game is conducted 
dynamically, players decide their moves 
successively. The government is supposed to start 
the game at first, then the employer chooses his 
strategy, and eventually, the worker must finish the 
game. One must exercise care regarding how the 
situations for the players are rated; no matter which 
player starts the game, the outcome does not differ.
 
Figure 4. Dynamic game among worker-employer-government 
In Figure 4, the upper number shows the 
government’s payoff, the number in the middle 
shows the employer’s payoff, and the lower number 
shows the worker’s payoff. The sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium is obtained through backward 
induction. In Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) 
of this game, the government will choose strategy 
K, the employer will choose strategy C, and the 
worker will choose strategy C. Of course, no matter 
which player starts the game, the same result would 
be achieved; if the first player is reluctant to change 
the status quo, the other two players still choose the 
strategy of changing the status quo. These results 
come with the assumption that the risk level of the 
three players is the same. If the government is 
supposed to have more risk-taking power than the 
other two players and will want to change the status 
quo (strategy C), then the employer will choose 
strategy K and the worker will choose strategy C. 
Even then, one of the players chooses strategy K 
and the rest choose strategy C. In fact, the outcome 
of the game is that one of the players will definitely 
choose strategy K. In other words, if the 
government chooses strategy K, the two other 
players will choose strategy C, and if the 
government chooses strategy C then the employer 
chooses strategy K and the worker chooses strategy 
C. Of course, if the government chooses strategy K, 
production will get better, because if the two other 
players (i.e., employer and worker) choose strategy 
C, the incentive for the worker and the employer 
will increase, which will lead to higher production 
and national income.  
The equilibrium achieved in a dynamic game 
among the worker, employer, and government is 
better than the equilibrium achieved in a dynamic 
game between the worker and the employer. In 
addition, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the 
dynamic game among three players in the labor 
market is better than the Nash equilibrium achieved 
in the static three-player game. In both the dynamic 
two-player game and the static three-player game, 
players tend to maintain the current situation and 
shape low-level productivity equilibrium. In such a 
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situation, the level of productivity and production is 
not very favorable, and the lack of mobility and 
dynamism in the labor market leads to lower levels 
of production and investment in manufacturing 
enterprises. However, in the three-player dynamic 
game, the equilibrium will improve, the worker will 
increase his productivity, and the employer will 
increase his profit. By paying part of his profits as 
a worker’s salary, the employer actually decreases 
the workers’ mental concerns and raises his 
concentration, which causes the worker to increase 
his efforts to increase production and thus increase 
the employer’s profit, and this cycle continues. In 
dynamic equilibrium, the government chooses the 
same strategy that it had chosen in the static game, 
but because the game is played sequentially, the 
outcome of the game differs from that of the static 
game. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The current conditions of the Iranian economy and 
its encounter with various issues such as 
unemployment and recession led the authors to look 
for the root causes of these problems; therefore, the 
labor market survey was targeted. The labor market 
is very important in terms of structure. An economy 
with a healthy job market will not face structural 
problems in other markets. However, if the labor 
market is faced with a problem, it will affect all 
markets and make them even more inefficient. If 
labor productivity is low, production will be low, 
and low production will reduce profits, lead to lack 
of investment, and lower wages of the labor force, 
which, in turn, will reduce labor productivity. 
Therefore, vicious cycles are formed, resulting in 
stagnation and decline of the economy. 
The main purpose of this study was to investigate 
the relationships among the actors who created 
demand and supply in the labor market, namely the 
worker and the employer. Of course, the behavior 
of the third factor (i.e., the government, which is 
very influential on this market) has been analyzed. 
The worker and the employer are always struggling 
to divide profits from the sale of goods, because 
providing one’s interests is in contradiction with the 
other’s interests. To analyze such a situation, a tool 
was needed to analyze labor market relations in 
situations of conflict. Game theory is the best tool 
for solving such issues. 
In this paper, the factors affecting the labor market 
in both static and dynamic situations, with the 
assumption of intervention and non-intervention of 
the government in the market, were analyzed. For 
each player, two strategies called changing the 
status quo and keeping the status quo are defined. 
Choosing a strategy to keeping the status quo is 
risk-free and cost-effective and in the same 
direction as the short-term interests of the players. 
However, the strategy of changing the status quo 
has risks and costs but was defined to be in the same 
direction as long-term interests of the players. If the 
players had selected the strategy of changing the 
status quo, the economy would probably have been 
out of recession. The status quo for the employer 
was defined as low profit, for worker as low wages, 
and for government as low per capita income and 
high unemployment. To solve the game of the labor 
market and compare different scenarios, four 
different games on the market were assessed: a 
static game of employer and worker without 
government intervention; a static game of the 
worker, employer, and government; a dynamic 
game of worker and employer without the presence 
of the government; and a dynamic game of the 
worker, employer, and government. 
In the static two-player game between worker and 
employer (without government intervention), both 
players choose the strategy of keeping the status 
quo in equilibrium, which is a low-productivity 
equilibrium. This equilibrium is achieved in the 
static game among the worker, employer, and 
government, and the three players choose the 
strategy of keeping the status quo as it is. The sub-
game perfect equilibrium of dynamic game 
between worker and employer (without the 
presence of the government) also represents an 
equilibrium with low productivity, and in this type 
of game, the worker and the employer will choose 
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the strategy of keeping the status quo. However, in 
the dynamic game among three players, the 
conditions will change. In this game, the player 
starting the game tends to keeping the status quo, 
but the other two players both choose strategies of 
changing the status quo. Therefore, if the 
government starts the game, the best possible 
situation in the economy will be formed because, 
on the one hand, the government will be able to 
increase per capita income without bearing risk, 
and, on the other hand, production, productivity, 
and wages will increase. In this case, it can be 
concluded that the worst situation in the economy 
is when the worker starts the game. 
One of the reasons for achieving a low productivity 
level in the games above is the uncertainty of the 
strategy of other players. In fact, no player wants to 
accept the risk of choosing the strategy of changing 
the status quo, and thus chooses a risk-free strategy 
(i.e., keeping the status quo). The labor market in 
Iran has a number of structural weaknesses; if some 
were eliminated, the labor market would be better. 
Some of these weaknesses are the lack of work 
morale, the absence of labor unions in support of 
workers’ rights, inappropriate policies of the 
government in the domestic and international 
arenas, lack of due attention to workers by 
employers, especially in social security, and so on. 
For example, if all workers decide to increase their 
productivity and increase the company’s 
production, then the firm will not be able to ignore 
this labor movement because of a strong labor force 
(i.e., the union) and will have to pay them more 
wages. 
In sum, achieving equilibrium with high 
productivity in the labor market requires the co-
ordination of all the factors affecting this market, 
and if there is not just one factor, the other factors 
will lose this motive. The most important step is for 
the government to build partnerships, increase 
working spirit, improve mutual trust, and adopt the 
right policy. 
 
Appendix 
Game theory is a mathematical tool for analyzing 
situations in which the behavior of individuals is 
influenced by others and their profits depends on 
each other’s decisions. There are several basic 
concepts in game theory, which will be briefly 
mentioned here. 
Definitions 
- Player: Individuals involved in the game are called 
players. The players are supposed to be wise people 
who remember all the events that happened in the 
past. The goal of each player is to play the game and 
select an action, maximize its payoff according to 
the game’s conditions. 
- Strategy: Action sets of players in the game called 
strategy. In simultaneous-move games, the concept 
of action (or movement) is the same with strategy, 
but in sequential-move games, these two concepts 
are not the same and the strategy consists of a set of 
player moves (or actions). 
- Outcome: Each outcome includes a set of 
strategies for all the players in the game, which is 
determined after the game finishes. 
- Payoff: Each player’s payoff includes the benefits 
he earns from each outcome of the game. 
Games are generally divided into two categories, 
co-operative games and non-cooperative games. In 
co-operative games, players co-ordinate each other 
to maximize their payoff, while in non-cooperative 
games, players will maximize payoffs without 
coordinating each other. The emphasis of this 
article is the non-cooperative games. 
Non-cooperative games are divided into two main 
groups of simultaneous-move games (or static 
games) and sequential-move games (or dynamic 
games). Static games mean games that players 
choose to move at the same time or without 
knowing the rival movement. In dynamic games, 
time is entered into the model and the players pick 
their moves in their particular order. Usually static 
games are represented in the strategic (normal or 
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matrix) form and dynamic games are represented in 
the extensive form. 
Static and dynamic games are also divided into two 
major categories of games with complete 
information and games with incomplete 
information. Games with complete information 
refer to games in which players have all information 
about the movements of other players and their 
payoffs from the beginning of the game. In contrast, 
games with incomplete information are games in 
which at least one player does not have information 
about the actions of some players and their payoffs 
in some outcomes. 
Equilibrium 
Game theory is a set of tools for predicting 
outcomes of a group of interacting factors that 
affects each other’s payoffs (Shy, 1995). The 
concept of equilibrium is very broad. In fact, 
different concepts of equilibrium are proposed for 
different games, but in general, equilibrium can be 
defined as a set of strategies that represent the best 
response to each other. In relation to any type of 
game, a new concept of equilibrium is defined. 
Normal form 
The normal form presentation of game includes: 
1. The set of players: We represent the set of 
players with 𝑁 and if a game contains 𝑛 players, 
the set of players will be as follows: 
(16) 𝑁 =  {1,2, . . . , 𝑛} 
2. The set of strategies: The number of strategies 
for each player is called the strategy set by that 
player. We show the set of strategies for player 𝑖 
with 𝑆௜. If player 𝑖 has 𝑘 strategies, then it can be 
written: 
(17) 𝑆௜ = ൛𝑠ଵ௜ , 𝑠ଶ௜ , … , 𝑠௞௜ ൟ 
The set of strategies of the game (with 𝑛 player) is 
represented by 𝑆 and consists of: 
(18) 
𝑆 = 𝑆ଵ × 𝑆ଶ × ⋯ × 𝑆௡
= ൛(𝑠ଵଵ, 𝑠ଵଶ, … , 𝑠ଵ௡), … , ൫𝑠௞ଵ, 𝑠௞ଶ, … , 𝑠௞௡൯ൟ 
3. The payoffs: Each player’s payoff is subject to 
the player’s and his opponent’s strategies. We will 
show the player 𝑖′s payoff with 𝑢௜ and define it as 
follows: 
(19) 𝑢௜: 𝑆 → 𝑅             ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 
Hence, the normal form of a game can be written as 
follows: 
(20) 𝐺 = {𝑆ଵ, 𝑆ଶ, ⋯ , 𝑆௡; 𝑢ଵ, 𝑢ଶ, ⋯ , 𝑢௡} 
 
Nash equilibrium 
In the theory of games, it is assumed that players 
are wise, that is, their chosen strategy is in a 
direction with their own interests. As a result, the 
decision of a player comes as follows: 
(21) 𝑚𝑎𝑥௦೔ఢௌ೔
 ∶  𝑢௜(𝑠௜, 𝑠ି௜) 
In which 𝑠௜ is the player 𝑖’s strategy and 𝑠ି௜ is the 
strategy profile of all players (except player 𝑖).  
In Nash equilibrium each player’s choice have 
maximum payoff to player with respect to 
opponent’s choices. Furthermore, the player’s 
belief about the strategy profile of other players is 
correct. The Nash equilibrium has a major feature 
and that is the choice of players does not necessarily 
result in more payoffs. 
Nash equilibrium is mainly based on the best 
response. The best response of player 𝑖 in a game in 
the form of normal form is defined as follows: 
(22) 
𝐵௜(𝑠ି௜)
= {𝑠௜𝜖𝑆௜ ∶  𝑢௜(𝑠௜, 𝑠ି௜)
≥ 𝑢௜(𝑠௜ᇱ, 𝑠ି௜)             ∀𝑠௜ᇱ𝜖𝑆௜} 
For each 𝑠ି௜𝜖𝑆ି௜ there is a set 𝐵௜(𝑠ି௜) that may be 
a single-member set or greater (Gibbons, 1992). 
Game tree 
Dynamic games are games in which players move 
sequentially; that is, each player must make his 
choice after observing the previous player move. 
Dynamic games are usually presented by extensive 
forms (game tree). In brief, the components of the 
game tree can be summarized as follows: 
1. Initial node: The node that represents the 
beginning of the game. This node is represented by 
a hollow circle. 
2. Decision nodes: The nodes represent the starting 
point of each player’s decision in the game. Each 
decision node represents the player’s turn. 
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3. Final nodes: The nodes representing the end of 
the game, in which the players’ payoffs are 
displayed in terms of their order of movement in the 
game tree. 
4. Branches: Each non-final node may have 
multiple branches, each branch representing a move 
for the player moving on that node. Each branch 
may end with a final node or another decision node. 
In Figure 1, a game tree is shown with all its 
components. In the figure, player 1 starts the game 
and the decision node of him (initial node) is the 
primary node of the game, which is a hollow circle. 
The initial node has two branches with the names A 
and B, which indicate the player’s choices in the 
game. After player 1 chooses his strategy, player 2 
will choose his strategies. In this game, player 2 has 
two decision nodes that correspond to the player 1 
moves. After player 2 chooses one of the strategies 
C or D, the final nodes will come out and the game 
will end. The payoff of each player is written down 
all the final nodes. The player 1’s payoff is the left-
hand side number and the player 2’s payoff is the 
right-hand side number. For example, if player 1 
chooses strategy B and player 2 chooses strategy D, 
then the player 1’s payoff is 3 and the player 2’s 
payoff is 4.
 
Figure A1. Game Tree 
 
 
Sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) 
To find the equilibrium in dynamic games, the SPE 
method is used. In this method, the whole game is 
divided into several sub-games. Every sub-game is 
a formidable game and is part of the original game. 
The players of each sub-game are the players of the 
original game. The whole game is also considered 
a sub game. In Figure A1, the sub games are 𝑔ଵ, 𝑔ଶ, 
and 𝐺; of course, G is the original game. 
The sub-game perfect equilibrium for games of 
complete information is obtained through backward 
induction. To find the SPE of the game, first start 
with the last sub-games that end up in the final 
nodes (for example, 𝑔ଵ and 𝑔ଶ in figure 1) and find 
the equilibrium of these sub-games. Then, we back 
one step and find the equilibrium of sub-game 
before it, and so we go from the tree up to the tree 
to find the last sub-game (or the original game). The 
Nash equilibrium of the biggest sub-game is the 
SPE of the game. 
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